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A substantial portion of information flow in the brain is directed top-down, from high
processing areas downwards. Signals of this sort are regarded as conveying prior
expectations, biasing the processing and eventual perception of incoming stimuli. In this
perspective we describe a framework of top-down processing in the visual system in which
predictions on the identity of objects in sight aid in their recognition. Focus is placed,
in particular, on a relatively uncharted ramification of this framework, that of the fate of
initial predictions that are eventually rejected during the process of selection. We propose
that such predictions are rapidly inhibited in the brain after a competing option has been
selected. Empirical support, along with behavioral, neuronal and computational aspects of
this proposal are discussed, and future directions for related research are offered.
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INTRODUCTION
The hierarchical nature of information processing in the brain,
particularly that of the visual system, has long been acknowl-
edged. Originally, work focused on the accumulating complexity
and sophistication added by each level of the hierarchy to the
one preceding it, as information propagates upstream (Hubel
and Wiesel, 1962). In recent years, however, a growing body of
research has established the opposite direction of processing as
well, from higher cortical areas downwards.
Top-down influences on perception are ubiquitous. From
context (Biederman et al., 1982) and mood (Basso et al., 1996),
to esthetic preference (Chen and Scholl, 2014) and inherent
perceptual biases (Ramachandran, 1988), numerous factors inter-
mix and contribute in shaping the subjective percept of a single
objective stimulus. Many of these influences may be regarded
as “predictions”, in the sense that they express prior expecta-
tions concerning the incoming stimulus. In Bar (2003), such
a framework for top-down visual processing was offered, in
which rapid implicit predictions are formed and utilized to facil-
itate object recognition. In this paper we shall first present this
framework, and then discuss one aspect of it in particular—
the fate of alternative, competing predictions that are not
chosen.
A FRAMEWORK FOR TOP-DOWN FACILITATION OF VISUAL
PROCESSING
Visual information is distributed across a range of spatial fre-
quencies. Low spatial frequency (LSF) information carries gross
outlines and object contours, while information of high spatial
frequency (HSF) encodes edges and finer details of an image.
LSFs of visual stimuli have been found to elicit early synchro-
nized activity between primary visual areas and the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), followed by a synchronized coupling of the OFC
and object recognition regions of the inferior temporal (IT)
cortex (Bar et al., 2006). This pattern of activation therefore
seems to bypass the ventral bottom-up visual processing chain
in reaching the prefrontal cortex (PFC), affording it early access
to coarse general aspects of visual stimuli. It has been offered
that this bypass pathway is enabled by magnocellular projec-
tions (Bar et al., 2006), which are quicker conductors and more
attuned to LSF information compared with their parvocellu-
lar counterparts (Tootell et al., 1988; Merigan and Maunsell,
1993). Indeed, stimuli biasing magnocellular processing prefer-
ably activate the OFC and evoke a pattern of functional coupling
between visual, OFC and IT regions (Kveraga et al., 2007).
Robust afferent projections connect early visual areas and the
OFC, both directly and indirectly (Barbas, 1995; Fuster, 2008),
and several possible routes have been proposed to account for
the rapid flow of activation in this pathway (Kveraga et al.,
2007).
According to the proposed framework, the OFC uses rudi-
mentary versions of an input to rapidly activate familiar object
categories resembling it. These activations act as hypotheses of
the input’s identity, subsequently combined with HSF bottom-
up processing in temporal regions to facilitate recognition (Bar
et al., 2006; Figure 1). LSF-based “initial guesses” assist, therefore,
in narrowing down the search space of identity matching. An
image of a tennis racket, by this account, will evoke a cursory
image in the OFC, which will cause a signal corresponding to a
racket, a guitar, a spoon and other object prototypes sharing a
relatively similar outline, to be subsequently passed downwards.
Finding the best match between these options and additional
bottom-up incoming information will constitute recognition.
Combining bottom-up with top-down signals in this manner
has indeed been demonstrated to yield optimal efficiency in a
computational model of visual recognition (Graboi and Lisman,
2003). Bottom-up information confines the hypothesis space to a
selected subset of options, which are then passed back downwards
to subsequently confine the breadth of lower-level processing
required.
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FIGURE 1 | Framework for top-down visual processing. LSF information is
rapidly projected from preliminary occipital visual areas to the OFC. Based on
this rudimentary display, predictions are formed and projected downwards to
IT regions, where they coincide with the slower ventral visual stream of
processing and facilitate recognition. In this illustration, an image of hairdryer
supposedly prompts predictions of a drill, a gun, a hairdryer and a boomerang.
Due to its cursory nature, LSF information is highly suit-
able for forming visual predictions of the sort described above.
Hypotheses derived from it may be sufficiently guiding and at
the same time not too specific or constrained. Such LSF-based
hypotheses may be seen as object categories in that a blurred
representation of an object typically encapsulates most of its
category members. Indeed, LSF information facilitates object
recognition that is flexible and resilient to changes in exem-
plars and viewpoints (Cheung and Bar, 2014). In this light, all
LSF-based images are at least somewhat ambiguous. However,
although some outlines are more informative and distinguishable
than others (consider, for example, the outline of a bicycle),
most LSF-based images would be expected to resemble and
therefore prime not only different versions of the same object,
but more than one object as well. A recognition process using
LSF-based predictions foretells substantial constant ambiguity
dealt with in the visual system. In this perspective we would
like to extend our top-down visual processing framework by
addressing a relatively overlooked ramification of it: the fate
of the initial guesses that first compete but are eventually not
chosen.
PASSIVE DECAY OR ACTIVE SUPPRESSION
LSFs of objects in our visual environment typically evoke mul-
tiple possible interpretations of their identity. One of these
guesses will ultimately be selected as the correct one as more
details are conveyed by the HSFs and combined in analysis to
constitute recognition. But what happens to the other alter-
native representations that have also been activated? Do these
obsolete hypotheses gradually decay and die-out, neglected in
the background while processing is concentrated elsewhere?
Or is there rather active effort exerted for suppressing them
rapidly? This question may provide promising new testing
grounds for studying the strategy employed in the brain for
conscious perception. Although no compelling evidence exists
so far to support either possible account, in this perspective
we would like to advocate as our hypothesis the latter, perhaps
less intuitive, option of active suppression based on functional
considerations.
At first glance, a mechanism in the brain for actively extin-
guishing activity that has been found irrelevant seems wasteful.
Being irrelevant, such activity should lack encouragement and
autonomously decay, so there is no apparent need in investing
additional energy in putting it out quickly. In the next section
we shall describe why we believe this mechanism is plausible
and in fact necessary in the brain, by considering the possible
benefits it might hold from a system point of view. Next, we shall
support our claim by describing various findings of such a strategy
employed in the brain in other domains. In the last section of
this perspective we shall put forward our prediction regarding the
mechanism of visual initial-guess competition suppression, and
its testable manifestations.
BENEFITS OF SUPPRESSING UN-CHOSEN PREDICTIONS
Visual predictions as suggested by our framework are helpful
in parsing a visual scene. However, once one of the predictions
had been chosen, the remaining alternatives become a potential
interference to network dynamics. Unless quickly extinguished,
such activations may, presumably, distort processing of new infor-
mation in light of some ambiguity that had already been settled.
Their efficient and abrupt dismissal seems therefore important
for ongoing performance. This is potentially true regarding any
predictive system in the brain. In the case of visual recognition,
however, chosen predictions become conscious perceptions, and
so the potential threat of distracting activations may be most
pronounced.
An elementary characteristic of conscious experience is its
unequivocal explicitness. Despite the bombardment of informa-
tion we are constantly confronted with, which is both noisy and
partial, our personal sensation is typically unitary, coherent and
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unambiguous. This is rather striking considering the breadth of
subliminal activity we know is evoked and processed simultane-
ously in the brain at any given time. Indeed, consciousness is por-
trayed in many cases as an all-or-nothing mechanism, compared
with subliminal workings that are statistical and inconclusive
(Charles et al., 2013). To achieve this task, the nervous system
must therefore be quick and decisive regarding interpretation of
the world, selecting only a single percept to dominate conscious-
ness at any given time. To this end, inhibition of the un-chosen
options seems cardinal.
Current theories portray consciousness as the product of a
large-scale connected component in neural network dynamics
(Dehaene et al., 2003; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). A mecha-
nism for focusing activity on one selected option by suppressing
irrelevant surroundings is important for the stability of such
a component. Strong surrounding activations could otherwise
potentially sway dynamics, even to the point of joining the locus
of activation, which would result in a different conscious percept
according to this theory. Therefore, efficient inhibition should
take effect, and materialize rather immediately after selection
when competition is highest and stability most fragile. This
would be crucial for keeping our perception coherent. An extreme
illustration of this idea may be found in the case of binocular
rivalry, where strong and evenly matched competing activations
are artificially created. The result is a non-stable perception
alternating between the two of them (Blake and Logothetis, 2002).
The mechanism we propose in this perspective, therefore,
is one aimed at “conscious decisiveness” and not ambiguity
resolution per se. In our opinion, inhibition does not accentuate a
single option over all others and thus helps in choosing between
them, but rather it swiftly removes activations once such a choice
has been made. The role ascribed to it is in “protecting” an
implicit decision from interference once one is taken, by teasing
out the to-be-explicit from the pool of implicit activations as
quickly as possible to eliminate competition. Our argument is
therefore for a post-selection and not a pre-selection mechanism,
in agreement with most findings of competition suppression in
the brain (May et al., 1995). In the next section we will overview
several such findings, describing existing empirical evidence that
provide initial support to our proposal.
EVIDENCE OF ACTIVE COMPETITION SUPPRESSION
In the realm of linguistics, ambiguity resolution has drawn con-
siderable interest over the years, and has been studied as a cog-
nitive phenomenon to the greatest extent. It therefore provides
good grounds from which to build our argument dealing with
LSF-based ambiguity resolution.
SUPPRESSION OF COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS
Numerous studies have shown that when an ambiguous word
is encountered, several possible meanings of that word are
immediately primed (Simpson, 1994), but access to all but the
correct meaning of the word is significantly degraded within
under a second of stimulus onset (Seidenberg et al., 1982;
Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991b). Such decline in activation seems
neither due to natural signal decay nor to competitive mutual
inhibition between concepts (Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991b).
Access to incorrect meanings may even become slower than
access to neutral meanings that were not activated to begin with,
providing further challenge to a mere decay account. This was
shown in a lexical ambiguity experiment in which stimuli did not
repeat, suggesting it is also not due to a prevalent memory-based
explanation of such phenomena (Nievas and Marí-Beffa, 2002).
It is interesting to note that the extent of suppression had been
found in that study to be modulated by the strategy employed by
subjects. Mirroring similar findings from selective attention (Neill
and Westberry, 1987), suppression was exerted mostly when
emphasis was placed on accuracy over speed, possibly indicating
that it is mostly recruited when distractors are most harmful
(Nievas and Marí-Beffa, 2002). Active inhibition, in any case,
seems to take part in suppression of ambiguous word meanings,
and its effect develops within a certain limited delay of selection.
Suppression in a linguistic task had been found when response
was probed close to, but not immediately after, ambiguous
primes. This was tested and shown as close as 467 ms from prime
onset (Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991b), and analogous effects were
also found under other modalities and tasks, within 1 s or less
(Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991a). In one visual experiment, for
example, subjects were presented with arrays of objects on screen
for 250 ms, and then later shown a target and asked whether it
was present in that array or not (Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991a).
As expected, it was found that when targets were not part of
the preceding array it took longer to reject them if they were
contextually related to the array than if they were not (following
an array of farm-related objects it took longer to reject the target
“tractor” than it did to reject the target “kettle”). An interesting
difference, however, emerged within subjects between “less-
skilled comprehenders” and “more-skilled comprehenders” when
targets were shown not immediately after the array display, but 1
s later. After a 1 s delay, the prolonged response times incurred by
contextual relatedness remained in less-skilled comprehenders,
while they had completely disappeared in skilled comprehenders.
Successful comprehension of a visual scene seems to rely to some
extent on the efficient suppression of potential distractors. This
paradigm has proven so fruitful that suppression of inappropriate
options was argued to be an overarching pivotal skill in
comprehension in general (Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991a).
SUBLIMINALLY INDUCED COMPETITION
In the studies discussed above, competing alternatives stemmed
from conscious perception of an ambiguous stimulus. Their sup-
pression may therefore be seen as a form of cognitive inhibition,
known to be a major factor in a wide array of decision-making
tasks, supposedly controlled by executive functions in the PFC
(Miyake et al., 2000; Aron et al., 2004). LSF of visual objects, how-
ever, are presumed to elicit a fleeting subliminal perception. Here
we present findings from motor control research that support our
proposal of predictive activation and subsequent inhibition that
are triggered subliminally.
In Eimer and Schlaghecken (1998), subjects were to press
either a left or a right key, as fast and accurately as possible,
according to given cues. Each cue was preceded by an additional
masked prime cue that was not consciously perceived. It was
found that primes harmed performance when the subsequent
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task was congruent with them, and on the other hand improved
performance when the responses associated with the prime and
the task were incongruent. Researchers called this phenomenon
the “negative compatibility effect” (NCE), and offered that it is a
result of inhibition acting on responses which were only partially
activated (Eimer and Schlaghecken, 1998, 2003). A key insight
from this study is that performance in this type of task depends
not only on prime-target compatibility, but also on their relative
timing. Event-related potential recordings of motor cortex during
this task revealed that primes elicit activation corresponding
with the movement they denote within roughly 200 ms of their
presentation, but this activity reverses polarity 100 ms later and
dwells below baseline for around 100 ms (between 300–400 ms
of prime onset). The researchers found that when a motor choice
is made in this latter time frame, performance is impaired if
a compatible cue was given before the target, and conversely
enhanced by a “misleading cue”. If timed right, the primed
alternative will in fact be suppressed beneath threshold.
This effect had been replicated and proven rather robust in the
motor system. Importantly, when varying time intervals between
primes and targets, NCE was only observed following longer
delays (96–192 ms), while short delays of up to 32 ms generated
positive priming, in compliance with a rise-and-fall activation
pattern (Schlaghecken and Eimer, 2000). Eimer and Schlaghecken
(2003) propose stimulus-driven inhibition as a faculty compli-
mentary to conscious cognitive control. They call it “exogenous”
inhibition, in contrast to the conscious cognitive inhibition of
responses, which is “endogenous” (Eimer and Schlaghecken,
2003). Competition suppression of the NCE phenomenon vali-
dates the possibility of competing elements subliminally activated
and then inhibited in brain functioning, and demonstrates such
inhibition acting fast (within 100 ms).
EXPERIMENTAL PREDICTIONS OF INITIAL-GUESS
SUPPRESSION
Building on the two paradigms described above, the support-
ing evidence for multiple-alternative activation and suppres-
sion in ambiguity resolution, and the possible evocation of
them subliminally, we now turn to describe the testable man-
ifestations we expect suppression of visual initial-guesses will
have.
TIME FRAME
Active suppression of a concept in memory will cause an increased
difficulty in accessing that concept for a certain amount of time
thereafter. This is termed negative priming, as it is the exact oppo-
site of classic positive priming in which recently activated concepts
enjoy advantageous processing. Initial-guess suppression, as we
propose, should therefore join the varied multitude of cognitive
tasks that behaviorally manifest as negative priming for a certain
amount of time. Because the speed of visual object recognition
depends on numerous aspects of the stimulus (image complexity,
display duration, contextual information, familiarity, and so on)
we align the temporal description of our model to the time point
of recognition.
We expect concepts activated by visual LSF information to be
subsequently suppressed when additional information arrives and
confirms one of the competing hypotheses. Visual LSF informa-
tion creates enhanced activity in OFC areas around 50 ms before
major activation of object-recognition areas of the IT begins
(peaking at 130 and 180 ms, respectively, in the paradigm used
in Bar et al. (2006)). This is the time window LSF-based gen-
eration of initial guesses happens, according to our proposition,
so at this time interval multiple concepts should be activated
and positively primed (Figure 2, between “OFC activation” and
“recognition”).
Next, following strong coupling between the OFC and IT
regions, recognition is achieved. It is this moment, or slightly
earlier, that deems all but one activated guesses irrelevant, and
so presumably ignites inhibition. Based on findings from the
linguistic domain and others, we expect activation levels to drop
below baseline level within less than 500 ms of this moment. The
duration in which excitation should persist below baseline is hard
to estimate. Various different negative priming paradigms have
found an effect lasting between 0 and 8 s (May et al., 1995).
Persistence would be particularly interesting to examine in the
domain of vision, because visual context is typically rather stable
over time, and so a mechanism for longer lasting suppression of
irrelevant guesses might be desirable. A significant negative level
of activation, in any case, is reasonable to expect for at least 100 ms
(see Figure 2B for a summary of the predicted activation timeline
of an un-chosen initial-guess).
INHIBITORY MECHANISM
Inhibition of un-chosen initial guesses, as hypothesized in this
perspective, would operate only on the highest mode of visual
processing and not trickle down to earlier regions of the visual
pathway. Since selection is made between visually similar concepts
(sharing major LSF features) activity patterns corresponding
to them in low-level visual regions would be more similar than
not. Inhibiting a low-level region for one concept and not
the other would therefore be difficult, but mainly negligible.
Behaviorally, as stated earlier, inhibition would manifest as
negative priming between LSF-similar representations. However,
alternative interpretations of such a finding exist and would have
to be accounted for.
Whether negative priming indicates underlying inhibition has
been the subject of a long and rich debate (May et al., 1995), but
modern accounts tend to agree that both forward-acting inhibi-
tion and backward-acting memory mechanisms may give rise to
negative priming under different experimental settings (Tipper,
2001; Mayr and Buchner, 2007). According to memory-based
accounts, negative priming occurs when a task evokes previous
processing episodes from memory and these episodes conflict
with current settings. The conflict may lay in the response associ-
ated with the target of the task (previously ignored but currently
requiring a response) (Neill et al., 1992) or in the different features
the target object had in both episodes (Park and Kanwisher, 1994).
A prerequisite for these accounts, in either case, is that the target
serves as a good retrieval cue to a previous prime. This would
seem less probable in an experiment examining suppression of
LSF-based predictions. Unlike most negative priming paradigms,
primes and targets of our framework would be dissimilar (a guitar
and a tennis racket, for example). The supposed activation and
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FIGURE 2 | Proposed activation patterns of LSF-induced hypotheses.
When presented an object (a hairdryer in this example), an LSF version of it is
extracted and projected to the OFC. This cursory image activates resembling
objects in memory, acting as hypotheses for recognition. In this case three
such hypotheses are depicted. (A) The correct hypothesis is activated when
an image reaches the OFC, like any other hypothesis. When additional
information combines with it for recognition, it receives additional
encouragment and will therefore display a classic positive priming affect for
substantial time. (B) Competing initial hypotheses (a drill in this example), will
initially be activated, but once recognition of a competing option will be made,
our model proposes they will go under inhibition. Activation of an obsolete
hypothesis of this sort should begin dropping and cross baseline activity.
Undershooting the baseline will manifest as negative priming for a certain
short period of time. (C) An example of an especially weak hypotheses,
bearning minimal resemblance to the original image. According to several
findings of threshold-dependent behavior of inhibition, a weak activation of
this sort may not be inhibited at all, despite it being an un-chosen hypothesis
like (B).
rejection of the target in the prime episode, moreover, is implicit
and not encoded in memory. Therefore, under experimental
settings in which targets are fully visible and processed, it is
unlikely that a reliance on memory retrieval would be promoted
(May et al., 1995), and negative priming in these cases would be
better explained by neuronal inhibition. Settings examining our
framework would therefore favor an inhibition explanation, in
our opinion, but careful design would nevertheless have to regard
the alternative accounts.
Lastly, an additional research path, considering associative
strength, may shed light on the characteristics of the inhibition we
propose. In several studies, neural inhibition behaves in a seem-
ingly threshold-dependent manner. In such cases, surprisingly no
inhibition is applied when activation strength is particularly low.
It has been found that activations that are especially weak are
allowed to linger, spared the neural inhibition their counterparts
receive, as if going “beneath the radar” of neural inhibition (Eimer
and Schlaghecken, 2003; Tsushima et al., 2006). This aspect allows
postulating that certain guesses may not be inhibited if their
activation was particularly small to begin with. In our case,
activations would be weak if the outline of the display and the
outline of the guess are only remotely similar, analogous to a guess
that is less probable (Figure 2C). This could be an interesting
research path to follow, one that could yield firm evidence that the
processes supporting this type of inhibition are similar to the ones
supporting resembling phenomena mentioned here from selective
attention and motor control.
SUMMARY
In this perspective we have overviewed our framework for top-
down processing in the visual system, and focused on a partic-
ularly intriguing and understudied implication of it: the fate of
un-chosen predictions. Albeit counter-intuitive, we believe that
irrelevant activations of this sort undergo active inhibition in the
brain. Such conduct seems important for maintaining stability
and coherence in ongoing conscious perception. Reviewing evi-
dence from different research areas of neuroscience, it seems that
activation of numerous options, followed by coincided facilitation
of one and inhibition of the rest, is characteristic of normal
brain functioning. We hope future research will build on this
proposal and elaborate it, as we believe further scientific study
of this phenomenon will improve our understanding of efficient
strategies for visual and non-visual information processing, and
of human perception in general.
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